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FOREIGN DATA: IS IT SAFE IN UNITED
STATES DATA BANKS?
Recently, several nations including Canada, France and Sweden
have expressed concern that certain forms of information exchanges
between countries pose a serious threat.' The threat is based on the
age-old concern over power. In 1977 the French Minister of Justice,
Louis Joinet, addressed this new threat when he stated "information
is power, and economic information is economic power." 2 If one
country is able to devise methods to gather and store more economic
information than other countries, it then has the potential to acquire
a greater share of this power.3
The vast majority of data bases and data records are currently
located in the United States.4 In 1979, 259 million data bases and 94
million records were in the United States.5 In that same year only
269 million data bases and 55 million records were found in devel-
oped market economies.6 As a result of the United States leading
position many countries find themselves either relying on United
States data base information or depositing their valuable information
in data memory banks located within the United States.7 These
1. Kesler, Regulation of Transnational Data: A Statement of the Issue, 10 INT'L Bus. L.
193 (1982); see also Durka, Legal Issues of Transborder Data Transmission, 74 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 177 (1980).
2. Kesler, supra note 1, at 193. This statement was made by the French Minister of
Justice at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Symposium on Trans-
border Data Flow. This Symposium was held in Vienna, Austria in 1977. McGuire, The In-
formation Age: An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 6 (1979).
3. McGuire, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flow, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1980).
The term "data base" in a broad sense refers to the total category of goods and services which
make up the information retrieval industry. The term "record" refers to the total information
which has been compiled in each category of goods and services. Because of the newness of the
data industry, confusion arises as to what goods and services should be included in estimating
the size of the data industry. Further, there is a lack of reporting on revenues "specifically
attributable to data base services." U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transborder
Data Flows: Access to the International on Line Data Base Market, at 24, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC
41 U.N. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Transborder Data Flows].
5. Transborder Data Flows, supra note 4, at 24.
6. Id.
7. Note, The Development of Canadian Law on Transborder Data Flows, 13 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 825, 852 (1983). Most of Canadian transborder data flow "originates on terminals
in the United States." Id. This is contrasted with countries like Brazil which have placed bans
on products and data processing importation if they cannot be handled domestically. Id. at
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countries fear that because of the United States dominant position,
and their corresponding dependence on data information or data
storage facilities in the United States, they are in a uniquely vulnera-
ble position.8 The United States could feasibly confiscate this infor-
mation, exploit it in some way, and thus take unfair advantage of
them.9
This concern was pointedly brought to light by the following
incident. The fire department in Malmoe, Sweden had devised a
computer program which showed where the closest fire hydrants,
emergency vehicles and hospitals were located with respect to any
particular fire being reported.1° The program operated from a data
memory bank located in Cleveland, Ohio." For several days this
data was not transmitted to the fire department in Sweden, because
of a severe blizzard in Cleveland.' 2 When this situation was brought
to the attention of the Swedish government, it was justifiably
alarmed.' 3 The Swedish government recognized that this was not a
situation where the United States was refusing to transmit the needed
data. However, the incident raised the following concern: what
would happen if the United States ever cut off computer communica-
tion in the event of a diplomatic breakdown between the two
countries? 4
This Comment will focus on the concerns inherent in trans-
border data flow, 5 in light of the United States dominant technologi-
850. France has a regulatory agent which requires licensing for any transborder data flow activ-
ity. This agency may halt the transborder data flow activity when it appears warranted. Id. at
843.
8. Fishman, supra note 4, at 8; see also Kesler, supra note 1, at 193.
9. Kesler, supra note 1, at 193. The legal consequences resulting from United States
confiscation of another country's computer data stored locally, has never been addressed. It is
only a hypothetical question. The United States has never attempted to withhold another
country's computer data. A number of authorities have raised this question, however: What
would happen, if the United States withheld data information belonging to a foreign country?
None of these authorities have attempted to answer that question. See, Durka, supra note 1, at
177. See also Donoghue, Some Policy and Legal Issues in Transborder Data Flow, 74 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 187 (1980). This authority raises the security issue in light of a country
storing its five year econometric model in the United States; see also Novotny, Transborder
Data Flows and International Law: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 141, 161 (1980). If there is a denial or interruption of transborder data flow, there is a
national security risk; see also Fishman, supra note 4, at 8-9. Both France and Canada have
documented their fear of America's dominance of informational resources.
10. See Kesler, supra note 1, at 193; see also Durka, supra note 1, at 175.
11. Durka, supra note 1, at 175.
12. Id.
13. See Kesler, supra note 1, at 193.
14. Id.
15. Novotny, supra note 9, at 143-44. The term transborder data flow [hereinafter cited as
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cal and storage capability. Three possible methods the United States
might use to legally confiscate another country's data, will be ex-
amined. They are expropriation, economic sanctions, and the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act. Utilizing any one of
these courses of action, the United States could retain data which is
either being stored in the United States or transmitted from a central
data bank located within the United States. The other country's
legal right to compensation or return of the confiscated data varies
depending upon which course of action is chosen. These differences
will be analyzed individually.
The analysis of these differences will show that a country's inter-
est in its data information is not sufficiently protected from legal con-
fiscation by the United States under existing international law. Once
these insufficiencies are identified a discussion of the prospects of us-
ing a friendship treaty to resolve these problems will follow. The
United States friendship treaty with the Republic of Korea will be
used as an example because it contains several provisions which
could be useful in the protection of foreign data. Finally, this Com-
ment will propose a list of essential elements that must be included in
any treaty or international agreement to help safeguard foreign data
while it is being transmitted or stored in a central data bank in the
United States. In the event of a diplomatic breakdown between the
two countries this treaty would then address the relative legal rights
and responsibilities of the parties.
I. HISTORY
Currently, there are enormous informational exchanges which
are occurring between countries every day. This ability to exchange
information internationally has developed primarily through techno-
logical advancements made in telecommunications. 6 When these
telecommunications advancements were combined with developing
computer technology, a capacity to share significantly greater
amounts of information on a global level was created. 7 The result
has been a worldwide information explosion.'"
Prior to World War II, electronic communication between
TBDF] refers to units of information which have been coded electronically for processing, by
one or more digital computers, which transfer or process the information to more than one
State. Id.
16. Fishman, supra note 4, at 7.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 8. Currently the combination of telecommunications and computers has re-
sulted in "thousands of messages and billions of bits of data" being used on a daily basis. The
Vol. 16
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countries was infrequent.' 9 The first major advancements occurred
in the mid- 1950's, when an undersea telephone cable was constructed
which linked the United States with Europe.2 ° During the same pe-
riod, experiments with satellites were also taking place.2 Technolog-
ical advances in satellites lead to communications services on an even
more global level. Satellite telecommunication had the additional ad-
vantage of sharply reducing the cost of worldwide communications.22
Meanwhile, during that same period, equally significant ad-
vancements were made in the use of computers.23 Prior to 1960 most
information and recordkeeping was accomplished manually.24 With
the advent of computers, recordkeeping quickly became automated.25
Information was no longer stored primarily in files. It was also being
stored in computers and central data banks.26 This new computer
technology resulted in several advances that were not possible when
records were being kept manually.27
First, the computer was able to process and accumulate data at a
tremendous speed.28 Second, the computers and central data banks
had the capacity to store significantly greater amounts of information
than had been possible when data was gathered manually.29
The final major step occurred when computer technology was
combined with telecommunications technology. This allowed vast
amounts of information to be transmitted and exchanged on a world-
wide scale.3° This new global availability of information has created
an information intensive society; however, it has also given rise to a
significant number of new problems.
Some of these problems are of a local nature, while others are of
subject matter ranges from "international finance, news gathering, diplomacy, trade, transpor-
tation, [and] scientific research [to] intergovernmental cooperation." Id.
19. Id. at 7. The transmission of messages prior to World War II occurred via the tele-
graph, telephone and radio. E. MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICA-
TIONS 51 (1971).
20. Fishman, supra note 4, at 7. There are six undersea cables which connect the major
trade countries and a seventh one is currently under construction. Today undersea cables con-
nect the majority of the world's trading countries. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1972).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 229.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Fishman, supra note 4, at 7.
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an international variety.3' One major local problem revolves around
creating the computer data banks, in which newly acquired informa-
tion can be stored.32 Once this data is centrally located a decision
has to be made whether to share it with different organizations
within the country or to expand its use and share it with other
countries.33
States may in fact decide to confine data information solely
within their own borders.3 ' There are several reasons, however, why
most countries choose not to do so. Principally, the transmission of
such information furthers domestic and international commerce.35
Secondly, the establishment of computer-communication systems is
facilitated because these systems provide transnational corporations
with a quick method to disseminate information to their branch of-
fices. 36 As a result of this quickened information exchange, the eco-
nomic activity among such corporations is enhanced.37
The exchange of economic information among countries is
steadily increasing. As a result of these increases, there will be a
greater international use of computerized information systems.38
This increase will in turn require more central data banks and stor-
age facilities to meet the rising demand of storing and transmitting
information.39 Many countries are not in a financial or technological
31. See Novotny, supra note 9, at 143.
32. MCWHINNEY, supra note 19, at 51. The term central data banks has not been consist-
ently defined. In general, it is used to refer to any compilation of data about people or things.
Id.
33. See Novotny, supra note 9, at 144.
34. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 19, at 51.
35. Id.
36. Sauvant, Transborder Data Flow and the Developing Countries, 37 INr'L ORG. 359,
362 (1983); see also Kesler, supra note 1, at 157. In addition to the commercial benefits to be
derived, political relations may also be facilitated by regular communication of information.
See MCWHINNEY, supra note 19, at 51.
37. Sauvant, supra note 36, at 362.
38. See Transborder Data Flows, supra note 4, at 20-22. Computer service industries
since the mid-1960's have been able to offer a number of on-line data base services such as: (1)
powerful time sharing computers which allow a large number of users to have access to the
same information at the same time, though located far from the central computer; (2) "rapid
access storage devices" which have large storage capabilities; and (3) telecommunications net-
works that provide local access for dialing into a remote computer at far less cost than dialing
long distance. Id. at 24.
This on-line data base market is supported by the national and international computer
market. In 1970, the industry in the United States had revenues of $2 billion. Eight years later
the revenue had increased to $9 billion compared to the computer service industry in Western
Europe which in 1978 had revenues of only $5 billion. Id.
39. Id. at 24. As an example of the growing demand, in 1975 the United States had 177
million data bases. In 1979 United States data bases increased to 259 million. Id.
Vol. 16
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position to build their own central data bank facilities and, as a re-
sult, it will be necessary for them to use facilities located in other
countries.' When they use these foreign facilities they become de-
pendent upon that other country for that information.
Naturally, they want assurances that this dependency will not
place them in an unacceptably disadvantageous position.41 For ex-
ample, if all of their economic information is in a storage base located
within the United States, what would happen if the United States
chose to stop transmission of this data?42 The economy of such a
country could be seriously jeopardized if this information were with-
held.43 These countries are validly concerned that their rights to
their economic data information remain unprotected." The means
which might be used to withhold this information will now be
examined.
II. LEGAL THEORIES AVAILABLE TO WITHHOLD
DATA INFORMATION
A. Expropriation: First Legal Bases for Data Confiscation
The legal right of a country to expropriate resources found
within its territory, even though belonging to another, is unques-
tioned in the international community.45 The power of expropriation
arises from the State's right of sovereignty over its own economic
40. See McGuire, supra note 2, at 4. France has been a strong advocate in the reduction
of reliance upon basic data supplies and avoidance of United States data banks, for both itself
and other European countries. Id.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Donaghue, supra note 9, at 187.
43. See Novotny, supra note 9, at 160.
44. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder Data
Flow in Transition, VAND. L. REV. 1022, 1043 (1983).
45. This principle was specifically stated in several important U.N. resolutions including
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
32) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in, 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 238 (1974);
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
Sixth Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 251 (1975). It was also affirmed in Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) at 17, U.N.
Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in, 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 223 (1962).
All States have a right to expropriate. This right originates from a "State's sovereignty
over its natural resources and economic activity." The only issue concerns the rights of the
foreign investor who has had his property expropriated. See also Note, Creating a Framework
for the Re-Introduction of International Law to Controversies over Compensation for Expropria-
tion of Foreign Investments, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 163 (1982).
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activities.46
Expropriation occurs when a country takes "possession of per-
sonal, individually held assets and rights of foreigners which are lo-
cated in that country."47 In the United States, several elements have
been established which must be met for a valid expropriation. These
elements were best explained in the landmark case of Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, where Cuba had expropriated
assets belonging to United States firms.48
From Banco Nacional, it is clear that to legally expropriate data
belonging to another country two elements must be satisfied. The
first requirement is that the item expropriated must fall within the
classification of a natural resource, or natural wealth.49 The second
requirement is that the assets must be foreign owned.5°
There is confusion as to how to classify data information."
Currently, there are two major views as to how data information
should be labeled. Many countries have argued that transborder data
information should be viewed as a commodity flow.5" If one thinks
of data in terms of commodities, data would be seen as a physical
asset like sugar, coffee or wheat. Data would then fall within the
46. Note, supra note 45, at 163.
47. R. RIBEIRO, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C. 1977). Expropriation is based upon a narrow concept
of service and social interest. When a State expropriates, it is usually taking "personal, individ-
ually held assets, and rights of foreigners." Nationalization, by contrast, is a much broader
concept. This concept refers to a State's attempts to have the entire "ownership of wealth and
natural resources, as well as the means of production." Regardless of whether the country is
confiscating data through nationalization or expropriation the legal rights would be essentially
the same. Id.
48. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). On
July 6, 1960, following a serious break in diplomatic relations with the United States, Cuba
enacted Law No. 851. Id. at 878. This law effectively expropriated all assets and firms "owned
by national or legal persons of United States citizenship." Id. at 879. Several American con-
cerns were affected by the enactment of this law. Chase, Citibank and First Boston all had
assets located in Cuba. Id. at 878. Through the use of Resolution No. 2, Banco Nacional was
established to serve as the instrumentality which obtained all of the assets of these three firms.
Further, under Law No. 891, Banco Nacional was placed in control of all other remaining
assets which belonged to other private banks owned by United States nationals. Id.
49. See RIBEIRO, supra note 47, at 1.
50. Id.
51. International Data Flow: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1980) [hereinafter cited as International Data Flow:
Hearing Before a Subcommittee]. (Statement of Mathew Nimetz, Undersecretary for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of State); see also Kesler, supra note !, at 194;
see also Sauvant, supra note 36, at 360.
52. See Kesler, supra note 1, at 194; see also Sauvant, supra note 36, at 360.
Vol. 16
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definition of a product. Thus it would be an economic resource."
This being the case, it would satisfy the first element required for
expropriation. Others have argued data information is more like a
service than a product.54
There are several reasons why many countries adopt the view
that data information more closely resembles a service than a prod-
uct. First, it is maintained that data information is simply units of
information which have been coded electronically.55 This coded in-
formation is transmitted from a central data bank to another coun-
try. The information itself does not really leave the central storage
bank because the foreign country is only receiving a copy of the data
in the form of digital units. 56 In this view, data banks and storage
facilities in the United States are only providing the foreign user with
the service of receiving the data. As a service, it cannot be viewed as
a natural resource.
Since the test for expropriation set out in Banco Nacional re-
quires the existence of a natural resource, viewed as a service, data
would fail to satisfy this test.5 However data is defined, either as a
natural resource or a service, will ultimately determine whether the
first element of the test for expropriation has been satisfied. In either
case, there remains a second requirement which must be satisfied.
The second requirement concerns foreign ownership of the as-
set.5 8 It is questionable whether a foreign country can be said to have
legal ownership of data information.59
Whether data information can be legally owned is uncertain.6"
Information has traditionally been viewed as something to which no
53. See Sauvant, supra note 36, at 360.
54. International Data Flow: Hearing Before a Subcommittee, supra note 51, at 267.
Nimetz, expressed the notion that TBDF and similar services have not been seen as a product.
Therefore, they have not been covered by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[GATT]. This Treaty traditionally was an instrument drafted to cover products, not services.
Since the United States advocates classifying TBDF as a natural resource, it would fall within
the definition of a product. Then GATT could be used to cover TBDF issues. Id.
55. Note, supra note 7, at 825.
56. See Branscomb, supra note 43, at 1026.
57. See RIBEIRO, supra note 47, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Fishman, Legal Issues of Transborder Data Transmission, 74 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 185 (1980). "Traditionally, ownership rights in printed, recorded or broadcast words
have been protected by copyright law. Copyright issues yet to be resolved regarding computer-
ized information include the scope of information eligible for copyright protection and clarifica-
tion of the extent of protection. Id. In Banco Nacional, the banks whose assets were
expropriated had legal title to the assets. See Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 875.
60. See Fishman, supra note 59, at 185.
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one can claim ownership. United States patent laws express this con-
cept by being "committed to the notion that a mere idea or intellec-
tual process cannot be patented.",6' If these coded electronic units
only consist of information, and if information itself cannot be
owned, it logically follows that a country will not be able to claim
absolute ownership. If data information cannot be legally owned, it
will not satisfy the second requirement of expropriation: foreign
ownership. 62 Consequently, the United States could not use expro-
priation to legally confiscate foreign data.
If data information is classified as a commodity, and the neces-
sary ownership rights are present, data information could then be
legally expropriated from the foreign country. In such a scenario,
the foreign country would have the following legal rights.
Initially, the country which has had its natural resources expro-
priated would not have a legal right to its return.63 The only possible
right that the foreign country has, is the right to sue for compensa-
tion. Whether that country will receive adequate redress in mone-
tary compensation is uncertain because there is a lack of interna-
tional agreement as to what constitutes appropriate compensation.
64
The general rule of compensation in expropriation cases was
stated in UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Perma-
nent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.65 Under this resolution,
the owner of the commodity will be paid appropriate compensation,
"in accordance with the rules in force in the State, taking such meas-
ures, in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with inter-
national law.",6 6 This standard of appropriate compensation is
viewed differently depending upon which country has done the ex-
propriating and which country is seeking the compensation.67 Fur-
ther, some developing countries and socialist countries have rejected
the need for appropriate compensation. 68 There are even some un-
derdeveloped and socialist countries that contend no compensation is
61. D. BRANDON, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS 56 (1976); see also Honduis, Data Law
in Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 87, 88 (1980).
62. See Fishman, supra note 59, at 185.
63. See Note, supra note 45, at 163.
64. Id.
65. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962),
reprinted in, 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 223 (1962).
66. Id. at art. I, § 4.
67. See Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d 875 (1981).
68. Id. at 888. The constitutions of some socialist countries state that full value for expro-
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required.69
The United States has, on the other hand, argued that expropri-
ation must be followed by prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion.7° Moreover, "this duty to justly compensate is constitutionally
mandated in the United States."
7 1
Some difficult problems in determining what is adequate com-
pensation could be expected to arise in attempting to assign a value
to data information. 72 First, the foreign user's legal rights to com-
pensation would be dependent on the present state of the United
States economy. 73 The United States courts would assess the worth
of the data information at the time of expropriation.74 Second, the
problem of valuation is further complicated by the fact that there is
no current method whereby the worth of data information may be
conclusively determined. 75 Therefore, if data information is looked
upon as a commodity, it is imperative that a foreign party be able to
assign a value for its actual worth. Furthermore, to ensure that the
foreign user's legal rights are protected, there should be an agreement
to full compensation for that assigned value, regardless of the state of
the economy.
Expropriation, of course, is only one means by which the United
States could legally confiscate data information. Another course of
action which would permit the legal confiscation of data would be
through the use of economic sanctions.
B. UN Security Council Sanctions Against the Storage Country: A
Second Basis for Data Confiscation
Through the mechanism of economic sanctions, the United
States could legally withhold another country's foreign data. This
69. See Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 875.
70. Id.
71. See Note, supra note 45, at 165. The United States Constitution states "[Nor] shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. Amend. V.
In Banco Nacional, this view of compensation was followed. Banco Nacional sought to
recover funds owed by Chase Manhattan and Chase sought to set off the amount expropriated
from its branch banks located in Cuba. The Court of Appeals evaluated each of these claims
and determined that in light of the Cuban economy Chase had received full compensation.
Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 877-79. While Banco Nacional indicates that the United States
does not always give complete compensation, it will give compensation which is adequate and
fair in light of the present American economy. Id.
72. See Fishman, supra note, 59, at 185.
73. See Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 877-79.
74. Id.
75. See Fishman, supra note 59, at 185; see also Branscomb, supra note 43, at 1025.
355
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could occur in two different ways. First, the UN could request assist-
ance from the United States in placing economic sanctions on an-
other country. The second alternative is that the United States could
decide on its own to place economic sanctions on another country.
In each instance, there would be different legal remedies available for
the return of the withheld data.
1. The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN
The use of international sanctions was first recognized in the
1919 League of Nations Covenant.76 The League's use of sanctions
was not considered to have been effective.7 7 The UN, as heir to the
League, has made substantial improvements in their use of economic
sanctions.78
The UN may request that countries impose economic sanctions
against other countries by invoking Articles 39 and 41 of Chapter
VII of the UN Charter.79 Article 39 provides: "The Security Coun-
cil shall determine the existence of any breach of the peace or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations. . . ." 8 Article 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its deci-
sions, and it may call on Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interrup-
tion of economic relations and of ... telegraphic ... and other
means of communication and the severance of diplomatic
relations.
8 1
76. Note, Economic Sanctions. An Effective Alternative to Military Coercion?, 6 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 289, 291 (1980).
77. Id. at 292-93. Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant provided that should a
member State resort to war against any other member State, an economic boycott by all other
member States could result. Procedurally there was no provision for enforcement of the boy-
cott. The covenant only provided that the member States themselves should police against
breaches to the international peace. This made the use of boycotts ineffective. Neff, The Law
of Economic Coercion: Lesson from the Past and Indications of the Future, 20 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 431 (1981).
78. See Note, supra note 76, at 293. The reason the U.N. has improved in its use of
economic sanctions stems from the new procedures being used. It is no longer the individual
member States who are charged with the duty to guard the international community. Now
these member States are only obliged "'to serve the cause of peace if called upon by the Security
Council to do so." Neff, supra note 77, at 431.
79. See Note, supra note 76, at 293; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 39 does not define what type of threat needs to exist
before the U.N. may become involved. This has been intentionally omitted, in order to provide
the flexibility needed to encompass a broad range of factual situations which may occur in the
international community. See Note, supra note 76, at 293-94.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Article 41 gives the U.N. the authority to render economic
Vol. 16
11
Horgan: Foreign Data: Is It Safe in the United States Data Banks?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
FOREIGN DATA IN U.S. DATA BANKS
In the past, the UN has requested that the United States join in
economic sanctions against other countries. For example, in 1966
the Security Council requested that member States of the UN stop
importing certain Rhodesian commodities, and discontinue selling or
shipping military supplies to Rhodesia. 2 In 1967 pursuant to the
United Nations Participation Act, the United States joined in impos-
ing sanctions against Rhodesia. 3
The United States, following a request from the UN Security
Council, could be requested to discontinue exporting or importing
data information. A refusal to comply with such a UN request
would violate the United States legal obligation as a member of the
UN and the Security Council. 4 If a country threatened a breach of
peace in the international community, any nation which belonged to
the UN could be requested to render economic sanctions against that
foreign country. 5 While this type of "information sanction" has
never been placed upon any country, it appears from the wording of
Article 41 that it could be done.
Article 41 states that the UN may request an interruption of
"telegraphic" and "other means of communication.,1 6 In the event
that data information were classified as a service, this section could
be employed to place economic sanctions on a State and stop the
transmission of data service. 7 Since the process of providing data
sanctions. See Note, supra note 76, at 296-300. The Security Council has requested member
States to participate in economic sanctions on several occasions. First there was an attempt to
sanction the Franco government in Spain. No sanctions were imposed because the committee
investigating the issue found that no threat to international peace existed. In 1950 economic
sanctions were placed upon North Korea as a result of the North Korean invasion of South
Korea. This measure proved ineffective because Western nations had imposed economic sanc-
tions on their own, without waiting for a request from the Security Council. The Soviet Union
and other Eastern European countries refused to cooperate in an embargo against Portugal.
This embargo was passed reluctantly by the Security Council. The last embargo that the Secur-
ity Council imposed was against Rhodesia in 1966. Id.
82. Comment, Economic Sanctions: The Lifting of Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 253 (1980). Britain imposed sanctions upon Rhode-
sia in 1965. The British claimed that Rhodesia, a British colony, made an unauthorized decla-
ration of independence. The Security Council in 1966 passed a resolution to have member
States participate in these economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Id. at 253-54.
83. Id. at 254. The United States, "pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act of
1945, also imposed sanctions against Rhodesia." Id. In 1968 the sanctions intensified and,
along with the other prior imposed sanctions, prohibited the shipping of any commodity other
than certain humanitarian and educational products. These sanctions continued for twelve
years. Id. at 253.
84. Id. at 259.
85. Id. at 254.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
87. Id.
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service to someone in a foreign country requires transmission of data
through telecommunication or satellite channels it would fall within
the scope of Article 41.88
If data information is designated as a commodity it would like-
wise fall within the purview of Article 41. This section further states
that the UN Security Council may employ "complete or partial inter-
ruption of economic relations." 9 Data information, as an economic
resource, would then be covered under the term "economic rela-
tions." This request by the UN would require that the United States
cease all economic relations with the designated country. This would
appear to include the transmission of data information.
Should such sanctions be placed upon a country, in an attempt
by the Security Council to bring about international peace, the reme-
dies available to the foreign country would be minimal.
Certainly if they are also a member of the UN, they may seek
peaceful resolutions. Article 33 of the UN Charter states that parties
to a dispute which may, "endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, [and] judicial settle-
ment."9 The thrust of this Article's application is that if the United
States was withholding data information pursuant to a request of the
UN, Article 33 would provide a remedy to recover the data
information.9'
While the foreign country's rights to the return of the confis-
cated data appear minimal, this is not as serious as it might first ap-
pear. Past use of UN imposed sanctions have been mostly
unsuccessful.92 Further, there has been considerable hesitation by
the Security Council to employ such sanctions.93 Consequently, it is
more likely that the United States would decide on its own to place
sanctions on the country.
2. United States Use of Economic Sanctions
The United States has in the past placed a variety of economic
sanctions on other countries.94 If a country did pose a threat to the
88. Id.
89. See U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
91. Id.
92. See Note, supra note 76, at 293.
93. Id. at 298.
94. R. STEELE, THE IRAN CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JOHN BASSETT MOORE SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SYMPOSIUM ON IRAN 51 (1981).
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United States, one method of countering that threat would be to im-
pose economic sanctions. Additionally, the United States might
place economic sanctions on a country to assist a third country that
had been threatened in some way. In either case, the United States
could decide to withhold data information from a country by placing
economic sanctions on that country.
The legal rights of the sanctioned country would consist of the
following. First, the country could invoke Article 33.95 This would
be similar to the remedy available to them if the UN had requested
the sanction against the targeted country. However, in this instance,
the targeted country might have a greater chance of success under
Article 33. Under these circumstances, the UN would be a neutral
party, thus more likely to be successful in directing the disputing par-
ties toward a peaceful solution.
Should the use of Article 33's peaceful resolution provisions fail,
or be ineffective, the target country might attempt to resort to the use
of force. This may be possible because the resort to force may be
legal under the UN Charter.
96
Some authorities argue that the use of force by a country which
is being economically sanctioned, is never permitted under the Char-
ter.97 Others assert that it depends on the severity of the economic
sanctions.9" The confusion revolves around two articles of the UN
Charter.99
Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. oo
For some this Article appears to imply that a State could never
use force in the absence of an armed attack upon the country. 'o The
retention of data information would not be considered an armed at-
tack; although some argue that the words "armed attack" should not
95. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
96. Zedalis, Some Thoughts on the United Nations Charter and the Use of Military Force
Against Economic Coercion, 17 TULSA L.J. 487, 488-89 (1982).
97. Id. at 489.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 491.
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
101. See Note, supra note 76, at 493.
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be interpreted as meaning only a military confrontation. 0 2 They ar-
gue that an armed attack should refer to any extreme economic coer-
cion used by one State against another.10 3 If the United States
retained all vital economic data belonging to a State, this might fall
within the confines of extreme economic coercion. Those who advo-
cate this liberal definition would then argue that withholding data is
a form of extreme economic coercion and should be viewed as an
armed attack.
Article 51, however, only provides for the right of self defense
against armed attacks. In order to use this right, it must be shown
that an infraction of the Charter has been committed."o It is possi-
ble that the withholding of data information could be viewed as an
infraction of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter.
Article 2, paragraph 4 states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.
10 5
If the United States withholding of data was deemed to be a violation
of this portion of the Charter, this would give rise to the right to
employ Article 51 to defend against this unauthorized use of extreme
economic force.'0 6 The argument that would be made to justify the
use of force would take the following course.
First, the withholding of a foreign State's data violates Article 2
of the UN Charter. Under a broad interpretation this extreme eco-
nomic coercion could be considered an armed attack. Consequently,
the targeted country could employ Article 51 and defend itself
against this unjustifiable attack. Through self defense, the country
could then attempt to use force to recover the confiscated data.'17
Since the use of economic sanctions has only been employed in
limited circumstances it appears more likely that the United States,
faced with some perceived threat from another country, will use
other available legal remedies. The United States would likely at-
102. See Zedalis, supra note 96, at 491.
103. Id. at 492.
104. Id. at 491.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
106. Id.
107. See Note, supra note 76, at 298, 300. Of the few economic sanctions that have been
employed by the U.N., none have been analyzed as extreme economic coercion, which would
allow the sanctioned State to resort to force. The 14 year sanctions against Rhodesia would be
a good example of intense economic coercion. However, it has been expressed that to attempt
this type of analysis is complex, and perhaps even futile. See Zedalis, supra note 96, at 489.
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tempt to retain that country's data by invoking the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
C International Emergency Economic Powers Act.- A Third
Means of Blocking Data Information Flow
The third means by which the United States could legally block
the flow of data information belonging to foreign parties is the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).l' A reading
of sections 1701 and 1702 of Title 50 provides the essence of the
Act's powers.
Section 1702 states that:
[T]he President may under such regulation as he may prescribe...
prohibit any acquisition, holding . . . importation or exportation
• . . with respect to or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national has any interest ... [that
is] subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 109
Section 1701 states:
[Section 1702] may be exercised to deal with any unusual and ex-
traordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial
part outside the United States, the national security, foreign pol-
icy, or economy of the United States if the President declares a
national emergency with respect to such threat." 0
The purpose of IEEPA is to allow the government to temporar-
ily block assets belonging to another country during a declared emer-
gency. In contrast to expropriation, under IEEPA, the government
cannot permanently keep the assets. At some point, the assets must
be returned."'
IEEPA has only been used once for a declared emergency; it
was employed by President Carter to block Iranian funds following
the 1979 seizure of the United States embassy in Teheran." 2 The
108. STEELE, supra note 94, at 51. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
[hereinafter cited as IEEPA] was enacted by Congress in 1977. It actually dates back to 1917.
At that time, it was called The Trading with the Enemy Act. The difference, relevant to this
Comment, is that The Trading with the Enemy Act could only be employed during a time of
war; whereas IEEPA can be used during any national emergency. If IEEPA could only be
used during a time of war, its employment to confiscate data information could only occur
during declared wars. Id. at 51-53.
109. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1979).
110. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1979).
Ill. See STEELE, supra note 94, at 51.
112. IEEPA was employed by President Carter, pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,170,
44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979) to block Iranian funds. Id. at 51. All of the assets were not re-
turned with the hostage release. After much negotiation, it was determined that the remaining
'non-bank claims against Iran and by Iran against the United States, would be resolved
16
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UN failed to use sections 39 and 41 of the UN Charter to sanction
Iran" '3 but the United States used IEEPA to place its own embargo
on exports and imports from Iran.' 14
In order to invoke the principles of IEEPA and withhold infor-
mation, the threat to the United States must be unusual or extraordi-
nary." 5 The statute, however, does not provide any time constraints
as to how long the data information can be legally retained." 6 Thus,
it is important to see what legal remedies exist for the affected State.
The legal remedies to an invocation of IEEPA are unclear.' A
look at how Iran secured the return of their blocked assets after the
United States employed IEEPA, may shed some light on the reme-
dies available. Because fifty-one of the fifty-three Americans held
were United States embassy personnel they had a privileged status
under the Vienna Convention and Iran was obligated to allow them
to depart.' 8 The fact that Iran did not allow them to leave meant
that Iran had violated fundamental tenets of conventional customary
international law. 119 For this reason, Iran was not able to rely on
international law or assistance from the UN.'2 ° Another act or ag-
gression by a foreign State against the United States may result in a
similar limit of legal remedies. If the State has not violated interna-
tional law, then it could seek UN assistance in retrieving the with-
held data. '21
The first legal remedy became available to Iran with the recov-
ery of certain bank funds that took place simultaneously with the
return of the hostages. 122 The second legal remedy occurred through
the help of the Popular Republic of Algeria, which acted as interme-
diary for negotiations between Iran and the United States.' 23 Both
countries agreed to set up an International Arbitral Tribunal which
was to decide the remaining claims of Iran against the United States
through international arbitration." Amin, The Settlement of Iran-United States Disputes, 1982
J. Bus. L. 248.
113. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
114. See STEELE, supra note 94, at 53.
115. Id. at 90.
116. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1979).
117. Id.
118. Williams, International Law and the American Hostages in Iran, 1980 ARMY LAW-
YER (Dep't of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-86) 30-32.
119. Id. at 31.
120. Id. at 32.
121. Id.
122. Amin, supra note 112, at 248.
123. Id. at 249.
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as well as the claims of nationals of the United States against Iran. 124
The remedies available to Iran existed primarily because of the
superior bargaining position it occupied based upon the American
lives at stake. The Iranian example may be contrasted to a hypothet-
ical situation, where the IEEPA is used to justify data confiscation.
In this situation, the following points may be raised. First, the legal
remedies available depend upon the nature of the threat. In the Ira-
nian crisis, the bulk of the Iranian assets were exchanged when the
Americans were freed and the remainder of the assets were settled
later.1 25 Clearly, without American lives at stake, the incentive to
return the foreign data in whole or in part might never occur. The
less powerful country then may have more to lose because it has less
to offer at the bargaining table.
Second, the fact that Iran was supplying oil to the United States
gave an added incentive to arbitrate and return any remaining Ira-
nian funds more promptly than might have occurred otherwise.1 26
In a data retention situation, the incentive to arbitrate will probably
be strongest where significant economic ties exist between the foreign
country and the United States. In comparison, if the nation is under-
developed or one with which the United States does not have strong
economic ties, the United States could conceivably be much slower in
returning the confiscated data information.
Another factor which would influence the speed with which the
United States returns confiscated data is whether a treaty exists with
that particular country. In many of the treaties that the United
States has signed, there are provisions which require fair treatment of
the other nation. It would be a breach of the foreign State's legal
rights if the United States refused to accord equitable treatment to
any given signatory. The United States has signed a number of bilat-
eral friendship treaties that seem particularly conducive to protecting
a party's legal rights in the event of data confiscation by the United
States. 127
124. Id.
125. See Amin, supra note 112, at 249. Iran received $2.4 billion in assets returned from
the Federal Reserve in addition to $500 million from overseas deposits. Id.
126. See STEELE, supra note 94, at 51.
127. The United States has signed friendship treaties with a number of countries, for exam-
ple, see Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultations on Matters of Mutual In-
terest, Feb. 21, 1976, United States-Brazil, 27 U.S.T. 1034, T.I.A.S. No. 8240; Principles of
Relations and Cooperation, June 14, 1974, United States-Egypt, 25 U.S.T. 2359, T.I.A.S. No.
7913; and Treaty of General Relations, July 4, 1946, United States-Philippines, 61 Stat. 1174,
T.I.A.S. No. 1568, 11 Bevans 3. For a more complete listing of the variety of friendship trea-
ties see 5 P. ROHN, WORLD TREATY INDEX 318-21 (2d ed. 1983).
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III. TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION
The treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation are bilateral
treaties between the United States and any of a number of other
countries. These treaties consist of general provisions which are
guidelines of fairness with respect to treatment of property.128 They
prohibit "unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would im-
pair legally acquired rights or interests within the respective territo-
ries."' 129  The goal of the friendship treaties is to establish a
"framework within which mutually beneficial economic relations can
take place."' 3 ° One such friendship treaty was signed by the United
States and the Republic of Korea at Seoul on November 28, 1956.3''
This treaty includes several provisions which could be adapted in for-
mulating a treaty between the United States and another country
storing data information in a United States central storage facility. 1
32
Article I is a general provision which sets the stage for equitable
economic relations between the two countries. 133 It states that "each
party shall at all times accord equitable treatment to the persons,
property, enterprises and other interests of nationals and companies
of the other party." By use of the term "equitable," customary inter-
national law could be used to show that a particular State has over-
stepped the boundary of equitable treatment. 1
34
This important provision raises the question of what the custom-
ary international law is with respect to another country's assets lo-
cated within a host country. Customary law protects foreign assets
which are located within a host country. 135 Without these protec-
tions, it is doubtful that there would be any foreign ownership. As it
is, citizens of many nations own assets located in other countries.
136
This occurs because governments have not made it a habit to unjusti-
fiably confiscate foreign owned assets. 1
37
Article 1 of the Treaty between the United States and Korea
provides that "equitable treatment should be accorded to the [for-
128. See International Data Flow: Hearing Before a Subcommittee, supra note 54, at 268.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Re-
public of Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, 301 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter cited as
Treaty of Friendship].
132. See International Data Flow: Hearing Before a Subcommittee, supra note 54, at 268.
133. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. I.
134. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1976).
135. Id. at 1.
136. See Sauvant, supra note 36, at 362.
137. G. UNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (1974).
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eign] persons, property, ... and other interests of nationals and com-
panies of the other Party."' 38 The Treaty does not define what the
parties mean by equitable treatment, but a resort to customary law
seems most appropriate.' 39 Therefore, under customary law, the
data information if it were being afforded equitable treatment, could
not be unjustifiably confiscated."4
Article VI addresses what would happen if the United States
attempted to expropriate the data information. It states:
Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall not be
taken within the territories of the other Party except for a public
purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just
compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effective realiza-
ble form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property
taken. '41
This provision establishes that the amount of compensation to be
paid for expropriated property should be "equivalent value of the
property taken." By international standards this is a very high rate.
Article VI goes on to state that this value is to be established
either at the time the property is expropriated, or prior to that time.
With data information it will be difficult to establish a value; coun-
tries might easily disagree as to the data's actual worth. 4 2 There-
fore, the value, or method for deciding the value, should be agreed
upon prior to the signing of any agreement or treaty. This will avoid
later confusion and misunderstanding.
Article V discusses what action can be taken if a dispute be-
tween the two countries occurs. It states "either party shall be ac-
corded national treatment and most favored treatment with respect
to the courts of justice ... in pursuit and defense of their rights."'
' 43
The fact that a country might be concerned about being forced to
settle its dispute in an American court is understandable.'" There-
fore, Article V may be able to relieve that fear because it permits
resort to arbitration to be included as part of the contract."' Further
the Article states that the arbitration provision "shall not be deemed
138. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. I.
139. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 134, at 7.
140. See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of expropriation. Ex-
propriation is the legal means for a country to take another country's property.
141. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. VI, para. 4.
142. See Fishman, supra note 59, at 185.
143. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. V, para. 1.
144. See supra note 9. Countries fearing United States dominance over the data informa-
tion issue will not be likely to want American courts to resolve the dispute.
145. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. V, para. 2.
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1986], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss2/13
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
unenforceable within the territories of such other party, merely on
the grounds that the place designated for the arbitration proceedings
is outside such territories."1
4 6
In the event that the country is worried about the application of
United States law, the treaty should provide a place for arbitration.
If this is done, and if that country has signed a friendship treaty simi-
lar to this one, then it would have the assurance that the place of
arbitration designated would have to be honored.
1 47
Article VI could also be helpful in assuring equitable treatment
among all the countries who are storing data information in a United
States storage base. This section states that "products of either party
shall be accorded, within the territories of the other party, national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in all matters affecting
storage and use."' 48 This section would very easily be applicable to
the use of central data base storage facilities. Thus, if data informa-
tion is classified as a product, as some would advocate, then under
this Article it would receive most favored nation treatment. 4 9 It
should be noted, however, that despite the fact that the term "most
favored nation" treatment gives the impression of priority treatment,
in reality, it means that a party to this treaty will merely be treated
"4upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded ... any
third country."' 5 ° Therefore, it is only a guarantee of equality of
treatment, not a guarantee against retaining data information, or giv-
ing it any special protections.
The only Article that may create a problem is Article VII. t5 '
This Article states that "each party reserves the right to limit the
extent to which aliens may establish, acquire interest in, or carry on
enterprises engaged within its territories in transport communica-
tion."' 52 This Article does not provide a definition of what is to be
included within the term "transport communication."' 53 One ques-
tion then is whether it could apply to the communication of data
from the United States to the foreign country. If it is applicable to
data information, then there are two possible meanings. On the one
hand, transport limits of data information must be expressed prior to
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. VI, para. 5.
149. See Kesler, supra note 1, at 194; see also Sauvant, supra note 36, at 360.
150. See Treaty of Friendship, supra note 131, at art. XXII, para. 2.
151. See International Data Flow: Hearing Before a Subcommittee, supra note 54, at 268.
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the foreign country's initial use of the central data banks.'" 4 In the
alternative, it might imply that at any time it so chooses the United
States can and will regulate data transportation.151 If the latter inter-
pretation is used, this would mean that a foreign country could ex-
pect an interruption of data information communication, without
any limits. However, if the former interpretation is used, it would
mean that the potential limits must be addressed prior to or in the
initial agreement between the foreign country and the United States.
This is clearly the preferential position. Because computer data
transportation is of recent origin, it would be advisable to have a
clear understanding by the parties, as to the actual interpretation to
be given to Article VII.
The Treaty between South Korea and the United States appears
to cover some of the areas of concern that a country will have in
order to be satisfied that their data information will be secure within
the United States. There are, however, other areas that the Treaty
does not resolve, for example, the worth of data and whether data
should be classified as a service or a commodity. Further, it is not
enough that data information be safe within the United States, but it
must be safe anywhere in the international community.
IV. PROPOSAL
Two factors suggest that the United States should play a more
active role in ensuring that data information is safe anywhere in the
international community. First, a recent report showed that half of
the United States labor force and gross national product is informa-
tion based.' 56 Further, the vast bulk of automated data bases are
housed in the United States.' 57 The United States has a large eco-
nomic investment in the data information explosion. It is important
that this investment be adequately protected, and it can only be pro-
tected if all parties have a clear understanding of their rights and
liabilities. '58
In light of the dominant position of the United States, it is inter-
esting to note that the United States is behind other countries in at-
tempting to regulate and solve the problems created by this new
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Fishman, supra note 4, at 2. This figure is based on U.S. Commerce Department
statistics and qualified in the sense that it refers to "the broadest generic category of goods and
services, and not to narrow, specific bits of informational data." Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 47-83, 96-109, 119-30, 131-48 and accompanying text.
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information explosion. 15 9 Many European nations have State con-
trolled communication monopolies which set up policies for interna-
tional data flow concerns. 160 Their laws provide for data inspection
boards which have power to control what information can leave the
country.' 6 ' In contrast, the United States has no central policy-mak-
ing body, nor has Congress any current plans to enact one.
162
The United States Congress should be thoroughly appraised of
data information issues, and be actively enacting laws which are ap-
plicable in this area. There are several reasons why Congress has
failed to enact any strong policy in the data information area.
First, there is a strong lack of perception of the problems in this
area. In a 1977 press conference, Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Communications and Information, stated that Eu-
ropean laws were basically only concerned with privacy issues of data
information. 163 This view is an over-simplification of what is actually
occurring in the various countries. Many countries including Brazil,
Canada, France, Japan, and Sweden are drafting policies which go
beyond the privacy issue. Further, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Spain have bills pending which concern the regulation of data
banks. 16
5
If the United States intends to retain a dominant position in the
data information area, it might be jeopardized by these new laws. If
a country adopts controls which benefit only itself and which place
undue restrictions on the United States ability to transmit or store
their data information, it could prove economically disastrous.
166
A second reason why the United States is reluctant to set policy
in this area stems from its common law background of addressing
legal concerns. 167 The United States is adverse to drafting legisla-
tion, "until there is a proven need for statutory rules."' 16' Therefore,
it is natural for it to delay as long as possible, until a major concern
159. See Sauvant, supra note 36, at 370. A few countries have begun to design policies to
deal with data issues that concern more than protection of an individual's personal privacy
rights. The United States is not among these countries. Id.
160. See Kesler, supra note 1, at 193.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Bigelow, Transborder Data Flow Barriers, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 12-13 (1979).
164. See McGuire, supra note 41, at 370.
165. See Bigelow, supra note 163, at 9.
166. Id.
167. Poloman, Transborder Data Flows: The International Legal Framework, 3 COM-
PUTER L.J. 551, 552 (1981-1982).
168. Id. at 553.
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arises. 16
The civil law countries, by contrast, take the position that laws
should be enacted to anticipate a possible legal concern before it
arises.' 70 They do not wait to solve the problems after the legal issue
has arisen in a court of law. They view the United States lack of
legislation as procrastination, or worse, as an attempt on the part of
the United States to hide sinister political motives.'71 In light of this
different reaction to enacting laws, the United States Congress needs
to actively seek out the possible problems, which are developing
among the countries and make proposals to the countries involved.
Otherwise, this lack of Congressional problem solving could force
other countries to assume a lack of commitment by the United States
to protect the respective country's data, which is being stored in or
transmitted from central data banks within the United States. If this
perception occurs, a country might decide that its data is not safe,
and refuse to become involved with the United States.
One step the United States has taken to combat what appears to
be a lack of concern on its part is to propose certain guidelines on the
data information issue, to the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD). 7 2 This twenty-four member organ-
ization is well suited to deal with international data information
concerns.173 This is clearly not sufficient involvement because the
issues are extremely complex and require much greater participation.
One way to ensure that the United States will take a much more
active role is to have an Assistant Secretary of State for Information
and Telecommunications Policy.' 74 This office could set out to study
what subject area is included in the new information explosion, and
then make proposals to establish coherent international information
and communication laws.' 75 If this were done, unresolved issues
such as the value that should be placed upon data,' 7 6 how data
should be classified,' 77 the legal rights of the countries relying on
transmission and storage from United States central data banks, 178
169. Id.
170. Id. at 552.
171. Id. at 553.
172. See Fishman, supra note 59, at 183.
173. Id. The guidelines proposed to OECD are mainly concerned with privacy issues.
There is a need to focus on the economic issues of TBDF. Id.
174. Id. at 189.
175. Id.
176. See Note, supra note 45, at 185.
177. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 47-83, 96-109, 131-48 and accompanying text.
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and other important concerns resulting from the information explo-
sion could be addressed in a timely manner.
One action that the United States could easily implement in the
interim (to immediately demonstrate to other countries its concern)
would be to get more involved in a number of organizations which
are actively pursuing answers to the data information issues.
1 79
There are a number of such organizations, including the Intergovern-
mental Bureau for Information," s° the Council of Europe..' and the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 8 2
It is imperative that major efforts be made to research the legal
issues involved in the complex area of data base information. Only
through a united international effort can this complex area of data
information be fully explored. 83 Without a joint effort, controls in-
stituted independently by each country could reverse the process of
increasing information exchanges between countries and put us back
in history to the limited informational exchanges of previous eras.
CONCLUSION
The legal problems which have arisen as a result of the informa-
tion explosion will, by necessity, have to be addressed on an interna-
tional level. The fact that in a split-second data can travel from the
United States to another country, so that intervening distances are
irrelevant, makes it evident that the concerns involved are not local.
Thus, careful international planning is necessary to avoid the chaos
that would result from haphazard enactment of local laws concerned
with protecting local interest only.
This Comment has discussed three courses of action which the
United States could legally use to confiscate or temporarily retain
179. See Novotny, supra note 9, at 153.
180. See Branscomb, supra note 43, at 1040. The Intergovernmental Bureau for Informa-
tion consists of 37 member nations. This organization is active in formulating policies which
will increase the information flowing between developed and developing nations.
181. See Bigelow, supra note 163, at 11. The Council of Europe is attempting to draft a
treaty which would "dispense with controls in information transfers between signatories." The
treaty would have a common core, but would allow for signatories to accept or reject certain
provisions. This would allow for signatory flexibility.
182. See Fishman, supra note 59, at 180. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development has been involved in an international effort to raise the issues involved in TBDF.
This organization held an international TBDF Conference in Vienna (1977). The meeting was
attended by 300 individuals, from government, private individual and intergovernmental orga-
nizations. See Bigelow, supra note 163, at 11.
183. See Novotny, supra note 9, at 153.
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data information from a foreign country: expropriation, 8 4 economic
sanctions' 1 and employment of IEEPA. 8 6 This led to the conclu-
sion that the legal rights of the foreign country are often lacking im-
pact. This is because there is no clear definition of how data
information is to be classified. If it is property similar to a commod-
ity, one set of legal rights would apply. On the other hand, if it is a
service, a different set of legal rights would be applicable. Further,
the issue of what value should be placed upon data information is
unresolved, making compensation for loss difficult at best and more
often impossible.
This led to a determination that there is a gap in international
law, which needs to be addressed in order to ensure that data infor-
mation belonging to a foreign country is protected in the host coun-
try. While the United States has friendship treaties with many
countries, these treaties are only a starting point to bridging some of
those legal gaps.' 8 7 First, it will be necessary to have a clear under-
standing of what the term data information comprises, in order to
know which parts of the treaty are applicable. Also, it is important
to recognize that data information is an international concern, not
something that two countries can effectively control between them-
selves. Therefore it is important to extend the friendship treaties to a
multilateral treaty where a majority of the countries can participate.
Since the United States is in a lead position in the data informa-
tion revolution it is imperative to protect that interest by taking a
much more active part in resolving the legal issues. Currently the
United States has not elected to do so. While it is understandable
that the issues are complex, and no simple solutions exist, this should
not persuade it against a greater attempt to assist the international
community in seeking solutions.
There are presently many international organizations which are
studying the problem. While guidelines have been established, they
are ineffective because countries are not committed to guidelines.
Even if today's answers may be obsolete in a few years, it is necessary
to set up multilateral treaties that will work to solve current
184. See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
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problems with the understanding that, as issues change, amendments
will be adopted to fit those new concerns.
Sherry M. Horgan
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